Flanked by leaders of Fatah and Hamas, the two most prominent factions of the Palestinian movement, the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, announced on July 23 a unity deal between those two groups, which have long been at loggerheads.

This was a milestone moment for Palestine at a time when Israel continues to relentlessly pound Gaza, where more than 39,000 people have been killed in the war since October, and as Israeli settlers illegally grab more and more Palestinian land in the West Bank.

Many analysts are sceptical about whether the new deal will hold — previous unity attempts have floundered. But what the agreement does decisively is cement China’s position at the heart of the Israel-Palestine conflict at a time when the horrors unfolding in Gaza are reshaping the Middle East and, indeed, public sentiment around the world.

For China, this deal is one move in a larger plan to entrench Beijing as an indispensable power in determining the future of the world. That project itself isn’t surprising — the world’s second-largest economy has long wanted a greater say in the way the world runs. But China’s current approach marks a departure from the two extremes of diplomacy that Beijing has previously swung between.

That new style was also on display just four days before Wang met Palestinian leaders in Beijing when he hosted the Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, in Guangzhou. In recent months, Kyiv has increasingly been signalling a willingness to return to dialogue in a bid to end its war with Moscow. And Kuleba’s visit underscored a reality that is by now impossible to ignore: if any country has the clout over Russia to make it meaningfully engage in ceasefire talks, it is China.

In March last year, China brokered a détente between the long-time regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran. That pact has prevented the Gaza war from inflaming other tensions in the Middle East. And in February this year, China became the first country to recognise the Taliban’s envoy to Beijing, building on its influence over Afghanistan’s current rulers whom it has hosted repeatedly in recent years despite deep-seated animosity in the 1990s.

Yet, while China would like to project itself as an alternative global force — if not a replacement for the United States of America — equipped to mediate in complex challenges impacting the world, its diplomatic moves aren’t entirely a function of its strength. They are also a reflection of weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

For decades, Chinah sat on the sidelines of major global disputes issuing statements but doing little to actually resolve the crises. Deng Xiaoping, the country’s former paramount leader, described the dictum of Chinese foreign policy in the 1980s with these famous words: “Keep a low profile.” Deng’s point, as Ezra F. Vogel writes in his 2011 biography of the Chinese leader, was for Beijing to bide its time and build its strengths at a time when its economic liberalisation was still in its early stages.

But by the time President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, it was clear that he and his team believed that the time to keep one’s head low was over. The 2008-09 recession had knocked the US down while China emerged relatively unscathed.

Xi unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious network of highways, railroads and sea lanes to connect Asia, Africa and Europe. Countries raced to join the BRI. Since then, the sheen has worn off the BRI and concerns over mounting debt owed to China are only part of the reason.

Under Xi, China unleashed what came to be known as ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy. On social media and in press conferences, its diplomats would shun restraint and hit out in aggressive language and tones at real and perceived enemies. Beijing began to deploy economic and military coercion to pressure other countries to accept its worldview.

In 2017, after South Korea allowed a US missile defence system on its territory, China imposed a ban on group tours to its smaller neighbour. China is the largest source of tourists to South Korea. During the Covid-19 pandemic, when the then Australian prime minister, Scott Morrison, called for an independent probe into the origins of the virus, China hit back and slapped a series of embargoes and tariffs.

China also engaged in a series of border standoffs with India, from Doklam in 2017 to the deadly clashes in Galwan in 2020, as its troops tried to — successfully, according to some analysts — take Indian-controlled territory.

But while these measures hurt the countries Beijing was targeting, they also fundamentally damaged China’s relations with those nations without getting them to bend to Beijing’s demands.

While China remains a vital trade partner for India, New Delhi’s view of Beijing has changed, perhaps irreversibly. In 2010, the former prime minister, Manmohan Singh, had said that there was enough room for both neighbours to grow side by side. India is now convinced that China does not want to grow together. That reality has forced India to deepen security partnerships with countries like the US, Japan and Australia to mitigate any threat from its larger neighbour, even as New Delhi tries to avoid exacerbating tensions with Beijing.

Globally, China’s image as a bully has got solidified. Meanwhile, its economy has begun to sputter, while wary countries are beginning to try and reduce their dependence on China, withdrawing or limiting investments in the country.

A course correction appears to be underway. While China’s mediation efforts in other disputes grab headlines, it has also been trying to mend its own ties with the countries it has alienated.

In May, the Chinese premier, Li Qiang, joined the South Korean president, Yoon Suk Yeol, and the Japanese prime minister, Fumio Kishida, in the first summit among the leaders of the three nations in four years. In June, he visited Australia — the first such visit in seven years. Trade ties have improved.

Whether any of these attempts at rapprochement with neighbours work remains to be seen. The fate of the diplomatic deals China is trying to negotiate is ambiguous too. Yet what they reveal is a shift from China that India and other countries will be watching closely.

For years, Beijing has used its size in a globalised economy to drive its agenda. But an open world order also means that China, its businesses, and its citizens are exposed to pushback that could hurt them. China sees that now. But the world — including India — has seen China too.

Charu Sudan Kasturi is a journalist who specialises in foreign policy and international relations