For the past 51 months, the military crisis between India and China on the disputed border in eastern Ladakh has bedevilled the bilateral relationship between the two Asian giants. Despite 16 rounds of diplomatic talks and 21 rounds of military talks, the two armies remain arrayed against each other in an inhospitable terrain. This is the largest near-combat deployment by the People’s Liberation Army since the end of the border conflict with Vietnam in 1987. The former US intelligence official, Dennis J. Blasko, suggests that this is the land domain equivalent of the PLA navy’s reef expansion construction in the South China Sea and the deterrence operations conducted around Taiwan.
Blasko’s analysis of satellite imagery since 2020 shows that the PLA has constructed enough fortified positions in the area to support a full division-size deployment (around 10,000 soldiers) on top of the two border defence regiments (approximately 5,000 soldiers) already assigned to the region. There are around 20,000 PLA soldiers deployed over the 250-mile front in the Aksai Chin, including engineer, artillery and other support elements, reaching back to a distance of over 20 miles. These forces, scattered across such a large frontage, may be insufficient for the PLA to launch a full-fledged military offensive in such a difficult terrain. But by indicating that the PLA is ready to maintain its deployments near the LAC in eastern Ladakh indefinitely, Beijing has put New Delhi in a bind. India finds its forces overstretched along the border and noises from the security establishment in New Delhi suggest a desire for an early resolution to the crisis.
Eastern Ladakh, or the Karakoram plateau as the Chinese military media calls it, falls under the Western Theatre Command of the PLA. This is part of a new structure of command and control of the PLA which emerged a decade ago. The theaterisation of the PLA was one of the most important reforms initiated by Xi Jinping after he became the leader of China’s communist party. As part of the ongoing reforms under Xi, the PLA has focused on preparing to fight under conditions of the ‘Information Age’, integrating its services, arms and systems into a joint, network-centric fighting force.
By all accounts, the PLA has been able to take major strides within a short period of time towards the completion of the unfinished business of reform. This is a testament to Xi’s ability to push structural changes through a bureaucracy that has historically resisted them and an indication that the PLA is now on track to field a more professional and capable joint force to launch military operations. In April, Xi replaced the Strategic Support Force with the Information Support Force, which, he said, was “a brand-new strategic arm of the PLA and a key underpinning of coordinated development and application of the network information system.”
However, major weaknesses persist in the Chinese system as these reforms have not been tested in real combat conditions so far. The fact that the Chinese system remains a rigid one that prizes top-down political control is unlikely to encourage operational flexibility. The PLA has not fought a war since 1979 and notwithstanding the training exercises, cultivating proficient joint commanders in the absence of real combat experience is going to be a major challenge. Since the PLA is an army of the revolution where the ground forces have held the maximum influence and tenants most senior uniformed posts, questions of the army’s undue influence and the problems of inter-service rivalry in a joint set-up are likely to emerge.
The PLA’s reforms are not happening in isolation. They are part of Xi’s publicly stated goal of transforming the PLA into a “world-class military by the middle of the century.” It includes massive modernisation of the armed forces which has not really kept pace with the country’s economic accomplishments over the past four decades. China’s 2019 Defence White Paper had several references to the PLA’s deficiencies when compared with other armed forces, arguing that the PLA “has yet to complete the task of mechanization, and is in urgent need of improving its informationization.” The pace of the influx of modern technology into the PLA and the sharp rise in China’s indigenous defence production capabilities have taken most observers by surprise.
The Pentagon’s 2023 report on China’s military and security developments noted that the PLA navy is numerically the largest in the world “with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants.” Not only are the number of ships in the PLA navy growing but they are also gaining more capability. It is also developing into a global force, the report notes, “gradually extending its operational reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges.”
The PLA air force is not far behind. In his testimony on Capitol Hill in March 2024, Admiral John C. Aquilino, the head of the US’s Indo-Pacific Command, suggested that China may also have world’s largest air force soon. This is an outcome of China’s significant overall production capacity ramp-up in recent years, specifically for its cutting-edge fighters like the J-20.
These numbers gain greater significance when placed in the regional context where the PLA is expected to operate. Unlike the PLA, the US military is deployed all over the globe. It explains Aquilino’s claim that the PLA air force and navy combined constitute “the largest aviation forces in the Indo-Pacific.” Even if the US retains its long-range superiority all over the world, China’s regional dominance is strategically significant especially when it comes to the South China Sea or for a possible military operation to take Taiwan. The 2017 Australian White Paper thus acknowledged that in parts of the Indo-Pacific, including in Southeast Asia, China’s power and influence are growing
to match, and in some cases exceed, that of the US.
In Asia, as these shifts in balance of power cause new tensions, maritime and land border disputes will continue to create friction between China and its neighbours. The region’s seas and airspace are becoming more contested, leading to public confrontation like the one witnessed between China and the Philippines over a derelict ship. The US recognises that the contestation for power with China in the Indo-Pacific will largely depend on its actions in concert with other regional players. This intent is reflected in the AUKUS, a military alliance that will bolster Australian capabilities and draw in the United Kingdom into the region. Then there is another military partnership among the US, Japan and South Korea even as the US has further strengthened its military alliance with Japan. The Quad, which started with great fanfare and continues to earn Beijing’s ire, has stayed out of the military domain thus far.
Even as these battlelines are being drawn in Asia, most other countries in the region do not wish to choose between the US and China. Their aim is to have higher economic growth and avoid a regional conflict but they cannot afford to ignore China’s rise. They have to prepare for China’s capabilities because Beijing’s ambitions can change suddenly. The US maybe focused on the PLA’s global ambitions while decoding the Chinese concept of a world-class military but that is a luxury not available to China’s neighbours. Beijing’s current military capabilities and its declared strategy of winning informatised local wars are enough to employ force in the Asian continent and the Indo-Pacific. Those in doubt only need to look at eastern Ladakh and the South China Sea.
Sushant Singh is lecturer at Yale University
