The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, had made a historic visit to North Korea in June. The trip culminated with the signing of a friendship treaty, thereby reviving a partnership that had been rendered irrelevant since the end of the Cold War. This landmark event has consequences not only for the foreign policies of the two nations but also for the regional configuration in Northeast Asia. Russia had supported sanctions against North Korea in the past. However, this has changed with Russia vetoing the move to increase the mandate of the United Nations panel of experts overseeing sanctions against North Korea. Russia’s waning relations with the West on account of its invasion of Ukraine has led to improved ties with North Korea. However, geopolitical recalibrations alone cannot explain the strengthening of this bilateral partnership.
North Korea has emerged as a major munitions supplier for Moscow, with the US state department reporting that between September 2023 and September 2024, approximately 16,500 containers of munitions and related material were exported to Russia. This figure is expected to rise further as the North Korean Central Military Commission ramps up the fourth quarter of arms exports. The increasing imports also point to another trend; that of North Korea emerging as a potential military-industrial node for Russia, with military imports arriving by sea from Najin in North Korea to the Vostochnyport in Russia, from where the munitions are transported by rail to storage facilities some 400 km away from the Ukrainian border. In exchange, Russia sends food, spare parts, and raw material for weapons manufacturing to North Korea. This has led to the Russian Far East becoming an important transit point for trade.
Another notable development prior to Putin’s visit to North Korea was the increasing number of bilateral exchanges. Sergei Shoigu, the former Russian defence minister, had been to Pyongyang on a State visit in 2023. The North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, visited Vladivostok the same year. Both foreign ministers exchanged bilateral visits, as did Sergey Naryshkin, who has served as director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. These trends indicated an increasing interaction between the two nations.
The reasons for the signing of the friendship treaty are two-fold: first, giving meaning to the bilateral partnership beyond the transfer of munitions by adding the components of military assistance along with development of cooperation in trade, investment, science and technology as well as on non-traditional issues. Earlier, Moscow used to refute claims of North Korean workers emigrating to Russia for work as this would imply that North Korea could not provide quality jobs to its workers. However, now that there is an agreement on labour along with a domestic law in North Korea providing such emigration with legislative cover, it is likely that the number of North Korean workers in Russia will increase.
Second, according to the researcher, Abhishek Sharma, “the treaty signals a message to the collective West of a new partnership taking shape as the West continues to arm Ukraine in its defence against Russia. Sharma adds that the security components in this treaty are also in response to NATO’s increasing role in the region. South Korea and Japan being invitees to the annual NATO conference has stoked concern of the possibility of a NATO alliance taking shape in the Indo-Pacific. This will inevitably result in the formation of contesting security triangles, US-Japan-South Korea and Russia-China-North Korea, escalating the balance of threat perceptions in Northeast Asia.
The strengthening of the Russia-North Korea relationship may worry China. However, leaving Moscow to engage with North Korea may also free China of the burden of having to justify its relations with North Korea in light of Beijing’s increasing business interests with the West.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation. Views are personal
