A mix of factors, going beyond the scope of “signal disregard” by the pilot of the goods train that rammed into the Kanchenjunga Express near New Jalpaiguri on Monday, may have contributed to the tragedy that killed at least 10, an investigation by this newspaper suggests.

Amid debates on the safety standards of the Indian Railways on various platforms, the rail authorities formally launched a probe into the accident, whose toll rose to 10 on Tuesday with the death of six-year-old Sneha Mondal from Malda. Janak Kumar Garg, the chief commissioner of railway safety (CCRS) of the Northeast Frontier Circle, visited the accident site, inspected the tracks and signalling system and conducted hearings.

In his brief remarks on the investigation, Garg almost echoed Railway Board chairman Jaya Verma Sinha, who had said within a few hours of the accident that “signal disregard” by the goods train driver was the reason behind the accident.

“When the automatic signal system is not working, drivers of locos are given authority to run trains and they have to follow a standard procedure. Even after authority was provided, the incident happened. The investigation would be conducted to find out what led to the accident,” Garg told newspersons at the accident site on Tuesday.

He, however, added responsibility can be fixed only after the probe is over.

Not just Garg, the entire railway establishment in its official communications has been endorsing the theory of “human error” since the accident, which has become an embarrassment for the Narendra Modi government as the Opposition has demanded the resignation of railway minister Ashwini Vaishnaw.

“Holding a deceased man responsible for a tragedy is an easy way out,” said V.B. Singh, a former loco pilot and general secretary of the Eastern Railway Trinamool Men’s Congress. Anil Kumar, the loco pilot of the goods train, and Ashish Dey, the guard of the passenger train, died in the accident.

Manu Kumar, the assistant loco pilot of the goods train, has suffered severe injuries and is under treatment at a nursing home in Siliguri. “Once he recovers, those conducting the inquiry will speak with him to record his statements,” said a source.

Several other loco pilots — both present and former — and a clutch of railway employees cutting across various wings like engineering and administration told this newspaper that holding the deceased driver responsible before any formal investigation was “unfair”.

According to Singh, the goods train driver was issued the authority, through the form T/A 912, to jump the red signals between the Rangapani and Chatter Hat railway stations as the automatic signal on the stretch was not working.

This form is issued to authorise the pilots of a certain train to pass the “automatic stop signal at red” on stretches where there is a snag in the automatic signalling system.

“Before issuing the T/A 912 form, the Rangapani station master had to confirm that there was no train between the two stations on the same track. The accident has revealed that the Kanchenjunga Express had not reached Chatter Hat by then. Then the question is, why did the Rangapani station master issue T/A 912 to the freight train driver?” asked Singh.

The general rules of the Indian Railways — an operating procedure for various wings of the public sector behemoth which is available publicly — corroborated Singh’s version. “The Station Master after declaring the said Automatic Red signal as defective shall not allow any train to follow a preceding train the same block section (where the automatic signalling system is nonfunctional)...,” the general rules say.

The loco pilots of both the Kanchenjunga Express and the goods train were given the authority to jump all the red signals between Rangapani and Chatter Hat stations through T/A 912. The Telegraph is in possession of the two forms — the loco pilot of the Kanchenjunga Express got it at 8.20am while the goods train pilot received it at 8.35am.

The forms mentioned that the loco pilots of both trains were authorised to cross nine signals — AS-654, AS-652, AS-650, AS-648, AS-646, AS-644, AS-642, AS-640 and AS-638. “The goods train hit the Kanchenjunga Express from the rear near AS-650,” said a railway official.

While several railway officials claimed that the goods train driver “violated the speed limit of 20kmph set by the T/A 912 form” and rammed into the Kanchenjunga Express, the theory was contested by Singh.

“If you go through the T/A 912 form, there is no mention of any speed limit. It is another fault from the end of the authorities as they had issued the wrong form to the loco pilots. They should have given the form T/D 912, which carries the instruction on speed limits,” Singh said.

The manual says that if T/D 912 is prescribed to any loco pilot, he has to maintain a speed of “25kmph” and should continue to look out for any obstruction until he reaches the station ahead.

A senior loco pilot said that no train driver intentionally violates signals.

“If the driver overshot the signals at a high speed, then what was the assistant driver doing? There is also an emergency break with the guard of the train and why didn’t he use it?” asked the pilot with over 25 years of experience.

K.C. James, the secretary general of the All India Loco Running Staff Association, said that the tragedy also revealed a lack of proper training of loco pilots and other officials like station masters to handle such rare situations.

“The accident occurred in a situation which is rare.... The loco pilots and others were not properly trained to handle such a situation. It is the responsibility of the authorities to impart proper training, but it seems training is slipping down the list of priorities,” said James.

“When I joined the Indian Railways as a loco pilot in 1986, there was only one type of locomotive and the training period was for almost a year. Now there are 18 types of locomotives in our country and the training period has been cut down to seven weeks only,” he added.

Additional reporting by Bireswar Banerjee