As Syrian rebels put an end to half-a-century-old architecture presided over by the Assad family, the question raised itself — how much of this worked to a plan? Clearly, there were long-term moves at play and equally evident were the winners and the losers. In the former category fall Turkey, Israel and the United States of America. Iran and Russia are clearly the geopolitical losers, especially the former.
Less evident, but nevertheless of significance, is the link to the conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas and how it extended to also becoming one between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon. So, did the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023 trigger a long chain of consequences which could hardly have been anticipated at the beginning? Lebanon, Syria, Palestine have all changed beyond recognition. The consequences for Iran remain indeterminate.
Israel, too, has changed. To many in it, the present is a moment of geopolitical triumph — perhaps even equivalent to the one it had savoured in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in 1967 when it had vanquished the forces of Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Certainly, in the days and weeks after the October 7 attack, few would have anticipated the astonishing course of events that have followed — Bashar al-Assad in exile in Moscow, Gaza reduced to rubble, Hamas and Hezbollah decimated and Iran humbled, having to swallow the defeats of its allies and considerable losses within, both tangible and intangible. Who can say whether in the months and year ahead this moment of triumph for Israel will not be identified as the point when hubris again set in and created conditions for another setback.
There will always be a question mark over whether the Hamas leadership could possibly have anticipated the consequences of its October 7 attack, and to what extent there was any foreboding that a tactically successful operation can also be a strategic blunder.
As in other fields, geopolitical developments also have unforeseen consequences. History is replete with examples of errors of judgement and the unintended consequences which followed. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 was based on the faulty premise that the destruction of its Pacific Fleet would so unnerve the US and paralyse its decision-making that it would make it seek peace. Adolf Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 on the presumption that victory would be swift and Joseph Stalin’s regime would quickly collapse. Both these errors of judgement ended finally in the destruction, defeat and unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.
Numerous examples abound in our own neighbourhood. The LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 exemplifies an extreme error of judgement, the consequences of which ended in the organisation’s own extinction little less than two decades later in 2009.
Closer to our own times is the example provided by Pakistan’s continued agonies in the relationship with Afghanistan. In the past weeks, continued attacks by the Tehrik-e-Taliban were sufficiently provocative for Pakistan to launch air strikes against Afghanistan. This is not the first time this has happened — all in all, the deterioration in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship has been precipitous.
Few would have predicted as the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan in August 2021 that what appeared to be Pakistan’s geopolitical triumph would turn out to be such a pyrrhic victory in so short a period of time. Was this policy then based on a grave error of judgement or is it just the playing out of unforeseen and unpredictable consequences that follow major geopolitical changes? Great changes do unleash forces that could not have been foreseen which is why foreign offices, like wise stock investors, hedge.
But the breakdown in Taliban-Pakistan relations or the growing ease in the Taliban-India relations will not be the end of the astonishing transformations in Afghanistan. Already, Pakistani journalists are speculating about an entente developing between the remnants of the old Northern Alliance, now based in Tajikistan, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. However bizarre this may sound, the fact is that when circumstances change, so do alliance partners.
In Bangladesh today, there are underway developments that amount to a complete reversal of well-established past trends. Reassessing the role and the position of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is part of this as is a re-evaluation of the country’s relationship with India. That what was till just a few months ago one of our strongest bilateral relationships would unravel so swiftly and so comprehensively could hardly have been foreseen but the absence of any hedging certainly has further constrained choices now.
From early on in this decade, the coup and the civil war in Myanmar on the one hand and the AfPak situation on the other have suggested a growing convergence in the situations to our northwest and to our northeast. Bangladesh stood apart from this generally dismal scenario, especially given its strong economic and social progress in recent years. Since its Monsoon Revolution last August, there is now, however, a credible question mark over whether that progress will be sustained. The growing similarity in many different ways between the situations to our northwest and northeast is an alarming situation for us.
As we enter the middle of the 2020s, it is of use then to reflect on just how turbulent this decade has already been. There have been a global pandemic, a war in Europe, and another in West Asia whose consequences include a small genocide. In our own region, we have witnessed the triumph of an insurgency in Afghanistan, successful civic insurrections in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, a coup in Myanmar and a long stand-off between China and India that has only recently eased in intensity. If nothing else, each of these is a reminder that upsides can often prove to be as slippery as downsides and, just as everywhere else, being sensible in foreign policy means guarding against hubris and that usually also means hedging against risk. Our size and relative stability may temporarily insulate us but we will not be spared of the consequences of structural changes in our region.
T.C.A. Raghavan is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan and Singapore
