The old age home is a new social institution that came into existence first in developed countries and gradually made its way to India after several years. This variance in time gives Indians the opportunity to carefully consider the various aspects of this institution and its suitability to our society before allowing old age homes to become entrenched as an integral part of our lives. Although this institution is presented to us as a convenient modern facility much like a hospital or a hotel or even online shopping, like other modern facilities, it too has a history.

There are different ways of approaching an issue. For instance, looking at a sculpture from the angle it is presented — the intended point of view — is one way of appreciating it. Walking around it, on the other hand, provides a more comprehensive picture. Leonardo da Vinci, for example, examined Michelangelo’s David at the Sistine Chapel from various angles in an attempt to see if he could discover aspects that may have eluded Michelangelo. He did, in fact, conclude — correctly as it turned out — that the stone chosen would crack if placed outdoors. Similarly, no one has scrutinized modern social institutions as thoroughly as Michel Foucault. He proposed that modern social institutions like the clinic, prison or asylum are formed by the process of exclusion, thus replacing the inclusive model of social institutions prevalent till Durkheim’s time. This has remarkably changed our understanding of the nature of social formation.

Yet, even the indomitable Foucault did not theorize the institution of the old age home. I would like to claim that this was because he failed to read modern philosophers like Descartes and Rousseau who distinguished different phases of the modern self — namely, childhood, adulthood and old age. Instead, he saw the modern self as a homogenous whole. Even feminists like S.M. Okin, who highlighted the gendered nature of the modern self, took the gendered male self to be homogenous. I, on the other hand, would like to assert that the modern self is not only a male self but also exclusively a self that is adult although divested of advanced age, an important aspect of human existence.

While instituting the modern autonomous individual, Descartes excludes everything from this self except cognition. The excluded consists of childhood as it is the phase governed not by reason but by ‘appetites’ and ‘teachers’ who, according to him, do not give the ‘best advice’. He envisages adulthood to be governed by reason, providing a reliable ground for the formation of the modern self. Like a butcher packing minced meat, or a carpenter separating a log of wood by chopping off both the roots and the branches, Descartes packs the content of adulthood in the modern rational container along with reason, the combination of which ultimately constitutes the modern self.

Unlike his predecessor, Rousseau does not reject childhood, but he does seek to explain it away. In an enigmatic passage in The Social Contract, while dismantling the institution of family which he considers to be ‘ancient’, he characterizes the relationship between the child and the father as contingent. He says that children are free from the ‘father’ (why it is only the father and not the mother is a point that has been critiqued by feminists) after they attain adulthood. However, this leaves the deal incomplete as one might legitimately ask why the father should spend time and resources on the child without getting anything in return. In a traditional society, the account is settled when children take care of parents in their old age. However, this is not acceptable to Rousseau, as this limits the contract and puts the child in debt. This would also legitimize the return to family, which he is seeking to dismantle. So how does one settle this deal? If we read the passage carefully, the subtext reveals that children need not take care of their parents. The father takes care of the children until they become independent, and the account is settled. It is settled because the father is paying off his debt to his father by bringing up his own children. Therefore, the ‘deal’ is more in the form of paying off debt rather than the father forcing his children to be indebted to him. Rousseau replaces circularity in the family by half circles that move in a linear direction. Since children have no obligation towards their parents, two things follow: the modern adult self is available for production and the post-productive adult phase of a human being is moved to the modern facility of an old age home. These philosophers, therefore, disparage old age and are enthusiastic facilitators of capitalism, not romantics as envisaged by some.

With the elderly thus segregated, neither children nor adults are exposed to the experience of old age, a cost the modern self has to pay for individual freedom and liberty. Rather than approaching this from the aspect of concern or caring for the old, I wish to reverse the strategy and approach the experience of old age from the perspective of children and adults. Everyone will inevitably grow old, except in the case of premature death. It may therefore help adults to learn from the experience of the elderly and, in the process, broaden their understanding or even change their approach towards life and work. On the other hand, the old too can learn from the experiences of children if they lived together. Reliving their younger days through the children, like rereading a text, might help the elderly gain a better understanding of their own childhood and the subsequent impact on their lives. Similarly, there are experiences of the old that can equip children to plan and prepare better for their own old age. It is in this context that this denial of the experience of old age may take the adults away from an important domain of human experience, which one may have to confront suddenly rather than get acclimated to gradually. The experience of the old can be seen as a valuable asset for the future instead of being considered a burden. However, the production-centred modern life psychologically implicated the old in such a way that they are unable to see the trap similar to that of those inside the cave in Plato’s Cave allegory.

I wish to further claim that the old age home is an unreflected consequence of the significant changes to rationality, production, and adulthood brought about by modernity. It will be interesting to find out from the old whether, having now reached an advanced age, they would still choose autonomous individualism in hindsight. Reading modern philosophy is thus important for India as we can learn from the experiences from the West and formulate our own programmes to not only contribute to production but also to improve the life of the elderly.