The beginning of the G20 process with India as the president means a packed schedule of meetings on an agenda that makes inevitable a wide-angled perspective on global affairs. As a consequence, it is possible that granular detail on what is happening in our neighbourhood may get contextualised and minimised, if not overlooked. Multilateralism always has the seductive appeal of ‘Worldmaking’, and in the globalised ecosystems we function in, it does not have a substitute. In a world of pandemics and critical climate-change imperatives, the multilateral impulse must be fostered no matter how weak it may be.

Yet multilateralism has unavoidable limits imposed by history and embedded social structures. We get an illustration of this from Afghanistan where the direction of events follows a sequence unaffected by the outside world. The country’s trajectory since the Taliban takeover in August 2021 has followed a course contrary to the expectation some had that the regime would make minimum adjustments, however cosmetic, to reassure the world.

For the West, absorbed now by Ukraine and Russia, the resumption last week of public beheadings in Afghanistan was additional evidence that socially regressive measures were consolidating further. These were symbolised by the closure of girls’ schools across the country along with other instances of gross gender injustice.

Afghanistan’s more proximate neighbours also have pressing concerns. None appears sanguine that the oft-repeated reassurance that Afghanistan will not offer sanctuary to terrorist groups with third country agendas is being acted upon in any meaningful sense. Therefore, none is prepared to take steps beyond the limited engagement that each has with the Taliban. There is little sign that any country will bite the bullet in a hurry as far as diplomatic recognition is concerned.

These considerations apply with perhaps greater weight to Pakistan, the country to which the Taliban owes the most for its return to power. Notwithstanding the early hype about the Inter-Services Intelligence’s deep links with and control over the Taliban, events have not quite worked that way. It is true that the quiet satisfaction tinged with triumphalism which characterised Pakistan’s response and sentiments last year after the Taliban took Kabul has not entirely disappeared. At its least, that sentiment is still powered by the fact that the marginalisation of India’s presence and influence in Afghanistan is a major strategic gain.

But the original sentiment has been considerably sobered by the general drift in PakistanAfghanistan relations. Over the past few months, there has been a recurrent pattern of disputes at many points on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. None of these episodes can be termed as more than a local issue but aggregated together these underscore each side’s different perception on the nature of the border. This is usually expressed in terms of the Durand Line metaphor but there is a more concrete set of calculations on both sides. For Pakistan, national security demands that the border is tightly controlled. For the Afghans, an open border is in harmony with the way of life in the border region. For the Taliban in particular, the soft border was a major factor contributing to each of its ascents to power. It is hardly likely that the Taliban would want a change.

Two developments illustrate the increasingly troubled state of Pakistan-Afghan relations. This month, the Pakistan Mission in Kabul was attacked and the head of the post (in the absence of an ambassador) narrowly escaped with his life. The Islamic State has claimed the attack and, in a sense, it is similar to that on the Russian Mission in September in which two of its personnel were killed. If nothing else, this illustrates how fragile the situation in Afghanistan may appear to many in Pakistan.

Perhaps of even greater concern is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s announcement in November ending the ceasefire with Pakistani security forces. To most Pakistanis, this raises the spectre of the insecurity that plagued the country on account of numerous terrorist attacks by the TTP during 2007-2014. The disappointment with the Taliban is that even on as central an issue as this, it did little to help neutralise the TTP’s threat to Pakistan.

This is part of a general pattern — none of Afghanistan’s neighbours is satisfied with the country’s recent trajectory. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the Taliban government has not received diplomatic recognition even from those — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates — that had done so in its earlier tenure. But notwithstanding the isolation this imposes or the sanctions in place, the Taliban does not appear to be relenting or ready to traverse down the path of some accommodation to the demands of the outside world. Alongside this is the fact that Afghanistan is, however superficially, more stable and peaceful than it has been at any time in the past decade and a half. This is as good an illustration as any of the limits of multilateralism or of external agency in addressing protracted issues of conflict and reconciliation.

At the other side of the subcontinent, we encounter another example of how little influence outside agency can bring. Frustrated by Myanmar’s unwillingness to accommodate even minimum expectations, the country was kept out of the last Asean summit in November. For a grouping that does not believe in being intrusive into its members’ internal matters and disagrees with the West’s sanctions-driven approach, this was not a small step. Yet, whether it will have the desired impact is debatable.

Multilateral platforms are important and we must grasp the leadership opportunities they offer, such as the one we have today with the rotating presidency of the G20. It is an opportunity to introduce our ideas and views into the mainstream of international discourse. But it is equally vital that we recognise the limitations of these platforms and let our realities and those of our region contextualise our multilateral forays. Worldmaking has always been a temptation to Indian diplomacy. However seductive its appeal, it must be tempered with reality.

T.C.A. Raghavan is a former High Commissioner to Singapore and Pakistan