The parallels with 1962 are obvious. A strongman leader in China, in power for as long as he wishes to stay — or until he dies. An Indian prime minister who is unchallenged domestically but is under pressure to demonstrate strength to Beijing. Clashes and stand-offs break out along their undecided border. These incidents appear unconnected, but each builds up towards a perfect storm.

Except 2020 doesn’t have to go that way.The key for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping will be to avoid falling into the trap that Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru succumbed to 58 years ago — by learning from the past without becoming hostage to it.

In a brutal clash last week, Indian and Chinese soldiers came to blows with stones and clubs, resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh. There’s no clear evidence of how many — if any — Chinese soldiers died. Then, on late Thursday, China released 10 Indian soldiers it had captured after that brutal melee, with both Beijing and New Delhi officially denying that such a prisoner transfer had occurred.

These are the toughest days the India-China relationship has seen in several decades. And while it’s tempting to build conspiracy theories about how the crisis helps both governments distract attention from the coronavirus pandemic and economic recession, in reality the border scenario could prove to be a dramatic political setback for whoever — Modi or Xi — appears to come off worse. As the former prime minister, Manmohan Singh, said in a statement on Monday: “At this moment, we stand at historic crossroads. Our government’s decisions and actions will have serious bearings on how the future generations perceive us.”

But a few rays of hope are nevertheless shining through the otherwise grim Ladakh skies. The Modi government is so far abstaining from over-the-top warmongering that we’ve seen from the prime minister and his lieutenants with Pakistan in the past. Instead of threatening to cut off or reduce diplomatic contact, the two nations have, in fact, ramped up exchanges between their military and civilian officials.

On Monday, their corps commanders met on the Chinese side of the disputed Line of Actual Control to try to tamp down tensions and find a face-saver that helps both governments. Such crises are rarely resolved through one or two meetings, and it is likely that ultimately Modi and Xi will need to get on the phone to settle on some core principles for the relationship to go forward. But Monday’s meeting is part of a series of initiatives that will help lay the ground for that call. On Tuesday, the foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, over a video call, on the margins of a trilateral summit with the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov.

And the handling of the return of soldiers demonstrated an uncharacteristic political maturity from New Delhi. On the one hand, the government could not have publicly acknowledged that 10 of its soldiers were in Chinese captivity. At the same time, by quietly securing their release through a deal whose details we don’t know, the Indian government showed the astuteness to engage in necessary negotiations. Meanwhile, China’s decision to not advertise the fact that it had held Indian soldiers for several days shows it too is keen not to aggravate public opinion in India further.

That maturity has so far also been evident in the government’s approach to WhatsApp and street calls for a boycott of Chinese goods. It has quietly encouraged these demands, without formally endorsing them. China is India’s second-largest trading partner, and one of the biggest investors in the country. India’s much-feted drugs industry imports 90 per cent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients it needs, mostly from China. Snapping or severely downgrading economic ties with China would be akin to cutting off the nose to spite the face.

So what should India do to make China think twice about expanding its claims in Ladakh and other border regions? First, it needs to fortify its posts at places where they are vulnerable to Chinese intrusions. This can’t be a temporary measure. Next, it needs to involve itself more visibly in the selection of the next Dalai Lama — thereby reminding Beijing that India, too, can needle China.

On the economic front, the Indian government can identify specific Chinese businesses that are vulnerable if disrupted. Apart from the tech major Huawei, which has been seeking entry for the past couple of years, an obvious candidate is ByteDance. The Chinese firm behind TikTok needs the Indian market — TikTok’s largest — to fuel its rapid growth. Seemingly innocuous regulatory holdups for the operations of foreign businesses are a skill India’s bureaucracy has refined over the years. Now is the time to deploy them as a powerful message to China.

And beyond India’s borders, New Delhi should move to dramatically upgrade strategic and military ties with other countries on China’s periphery with similar concerns — such as Indonesia and Vietnam.

Will this prevent future border flare-ups? No. But it will ensure that China knows the costs India can impose without engaging in a military confrontation. Neither side wants a war. Modi and Xi need to make sure they don’t end up there accidentally.