According to the report, Education, Social Norms, and the Marriage Penalty: Evidence from South Asia, published by the World Bank, a mere 32% of working-age women in South Asian countries — the list excludes Bhutan — are part of their respective labour forces. The corresponding number for South Asian men is 77%. This low participation in the labour force by women after their marriage has led them to earn only 58% of men’s salaries. The report has attributed the phenomenon of married women dropping out of the workforce after nuptials to their domestic responsibilities such as child-rearing and housework. The problematic phenomenon has thus been rightly christened as the “marriage and child penalty”. Entrenched patriarchal norms expect women with careers to prioritise household responsibilities over their professional ambitions so as not to destabilise their married lives. Significantly, the World Bank report suggests that the ‘marriage penalty’ exacts a heavier price on women than the ‘child penalty’. This regressive ritual seems to be particularly potent in India where the female employment rate drops to 12% — one-third of the pre-marital employment level — five years after marriage even in the absence of childbearing. Indian men, in contrast, stand to gain a marriage premium; their employment rate spikes up to 13% after marriage. The institution of marriage thus works differently for men and women, bolstering men’s careers while forcing the latter to exit the workforce or settle for low-paying jobs. Insensitive employers exacerbate this inequality. There is a marked unwillingness among Indian employers to hire women of childbearing age. The data in this regard are disconcerting. The India Employment Report 2024 stated that on an average a woman in India spent six times more in unpaid activities than a man.

There is, however, a way out. The research by the World Bank has found that women who have higher education are likely to continue with their jobs after marriage. This underscores the crucial role that education can play in addressing the anomaly. There is equally a case for making relevant welfare initiatives — the Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao programme is one example — more robust and effective while also taking steps to bring about a cultural shift: redefining traditional gender roles in the realm of household chores and motivating — incentivising — companies to retain women workers can be avenues worth exploring. Enhancing women’s participation in the labour force has an economic rationale: it can increase South Asia’s GDP by 51%. Do South Asian nation-states need a greater incentive?