At the best of times, India’s political class has accorded a limited mind space to foreign affairs. At present, the outward gaze is dominated by the war between Israel and Hamas. This preoccupation with West Asia and the corresponding neglect of the immediate neighbourhood, ironically, bodes well for relations between India and Bangladesh — at present in a state of happy equilibrium.
India’s status as a towering, big brother has always complicated relations with smaller neighbours such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. This natural asymmetry has been compounded by India’s rapid economic growth and visible rise in national determination, at least since 2014. This increased elbow room for India may have worked to the advantage of Sri Lanka in securing a financial rescue package and counterbalancing China but experience suggests that generosity towards a beleaguered neighbour wins only short-term gratitude.
A perception in the neighbourhood that India is working overtime to trap neighbours in unequal and exploitative relationships has proved difficult to shake off. The asymmetry championed by the short-lived I.K. Gujral doctrine in the 1990s may have appealed to those who lit candles at the Wagah border, but it is doubtful if turning the other cheek has any domestic constituency left. Even the Congress was embarrassed by a recent article by an erstwhile national security adviser that the Manmohan Singh government averted a global disaster by not reacting in anger to the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist bloodbath in November 2008.
In recent years, the relations between India and Pakistan have not deteriorated any further despite the ‘surgical strike’ and the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 because there is no worthwhile bilateral relationship in existence. Yet, what is interesting is the absence of any pressure on New Delhi to initiate a thaw. In any case, there is no significant domestic constituency in India having withdrawal symptoms from not exchanging Urdu couplets across the border.
The uniqueness of India-Pakistan relations does not find reflection in diplomatic engagements with any other neighbouring country. Ever since Sheikh Hasina Wajed and the Awami League returned to power in Bangladesh 14 years ago, India-Bangladesh relations have registered a steady improvement. Apart from a developing commercial relationship that includes the sale of thermal power from Jharkhand to Bangladesh, there is an expectation that India’s northeastern states and Assam will renew their relationships across the border, perhaps culminating in the revival of Chittagong as the seaport of the region. Although the Hasina government has proceeded cautiously on the long-pending issue of a transit arrangement through Bangladesh for India’s Northeast, there is an expectation that a business relationship between the two countries can progress once the political creases are ironed out.
There has been friction over illegal immigration of Bangladeshis to India but both countries appear to have realised that controlling the flow will require political management on both sides. Unless the West Bengal government cracks down on the criminal gangs with political patronage that facilitate illegal movement of people by organising ration cards, Aadhar cards and even voter identity cards, this problem will persist. It is, after all, intimately linked to nurturing vote banks.
At one time, the reaction of Bangladesh to Indian concerns was one of denial and unconcern. However, attitudes have changed somewhat with the realisation that a section of the third tier of Islamist radicals — not to mention the killers of Bangabandhu and sundry razakars of yore — that has been targeted by the Hasina government has taken refuge in West Bengal and is using it as a base for political operations in Bangladesh.
Today, the problem has assumed a menacing dimension with the organised entry of Rohingyas, using the camps in Bangladesh as transit points, into India. Apart from West Bengal, there are Rohingya settlements in places such as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, Haryana, Delhi and Jammu.
Yet, as of now, neither Islamic radicalism nor the Rohingya issue can be said to constitute political impediments on the path of a wider India-Bangladesh relationship. On both these issues, there are no serious differences in perception between the two sides, although Bangladesh officials are secretly happy that the Rohingya issue is also being experienced by India.
Any unbridgeable trust deficit, it would seem, is entirely in the realms of perception. If the crowds outside the centres disbursing Indian visas in Dhaka are any indication, there is a rush of Bangladeshis seeking to visit India for different reasons. Many of them are quite desperate. Indian officials openly admit that the daily quota of around 5,000 visas need to be trebled if demand and supply are to match. The visa bottleneck has, in turn, fuelled wild conspiracy theories and negated some of the goodwill that should have accrued from Bangladeshi experiences in Indian hospitals, not least in southern India. Moreover, India remains the most affordable destination for shopping that corresponds to Bangladeshi tastes. Unfortunately, the experience is vitiated by complicated forex regulations that have promoted a convoluted system of hawala that benefits the underworld in both countries. In short, despite the dependence on India, Bangladeshis often end up embittered, believing that the bigger neighbour is out to squeeze them.
Those who witnessed the scenes of jubilation in Bangladesh after India lost to Australia in the cricket World Cup final should reflect on the rationale behind this bizarre conduct.
As things seem now, the Bangladesh general election scheduled for January 7 is likely to lead to another landslide victory for the Awami League. However, if the Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party persists in boycotting the polls, the legitimacy of the victory is certain to be diluted.
The United States of America has played a major role in casting the Hasina government as undemocratic and autocratic. This needless interference in the internal affairs of a distant country which poses no security threat has, at the same time, had a negative effect on people’s perception of India’s role. In some influential circles, it is believed that the Hasina government is controlled by India and that the US is being restrained from sticking the knife into the Hasina regime because India has put its foot down.
This feeling would have become a self-fulfilling prophecy had the forthcoming Bangladesh election generated popular and media interest in India. Fortunately, India’s preoccupation with its own polls and other distractions have ensured that newer conspiracy theories aren’t generated. But the relief could well be temporary.
