Aggarwal: Dulat Saheb, do you see the changes in Jammu and Kashmir in India from 2019 having any kind of real-world impact or bearing on how the Government of India claims Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan?
Dulat: Is there a solution of the kind we’re looking for? That is the question. I have concluded that there is not. The only kind is a very basic one: sooner or later, we’ll have to settle on the Line of Control. Musharraf’s four-point formula touted all over was really a one-point formula to settle on the Line of Control with cosmetic changes.
I agree with General (Durrani) Saheb regarding the India-Pakistan relationship: a stable status quo is good enough. That’s the best that can happen.
As General Saheb mentioned, when Durrani and Dulat talk, it gives the Kashmiri hope that these two mad guys are still talking. Possibly, something will happen — without realising that these two guys themselves are unimportant.
Asad Durrani, former director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate of Pakistan. HarperCollins
When Article 370 was abrogated, I felt sad. We’re only rubbing the Kashmiri nose into the ground. 370 was long gone, and now remained only a psychological and emotive issue — much like Kashmir itself.
But now that it’s gone, I’ve been arguing with myself about how to justify it to Pakistan. General Saheb was disappointed that Pakistan didn’t really react to the abrogation. I remembered Musharraf. I still believe that he was the most reasonable Pakistani leader in a long time. He realised that one must come to terms with certain realities. And what Musharraf used to say was, “Whatever is acceptable to Kashmiris would be acceptable to Pakistan.”
So, I was thinking, if the Kashmiri accepts abrogation, then what objection could Pakistan have? I think that what Musharraf said was fair enough. He was in a sense toeing the Kashmiri line, which sometimes unwittingly I also do because I’m attached. Because when you work in a place for a long time, when you know people for a long time, there is a certain attachment...
Aggarwal: General Saheb, you mentioned Articles 35A and 370. That’s a great segue to Kashmir, which has also changed since you both co-wrote The Spy Chronicles. The Pulwama attack happened in 2019; both countries deployed their air forces; Abhinandan had chai in Pakistan; and both those articles were revoked. How do you both assess the future of Jammu and Kashmir from your vantage points — not just of the territories within your own countries, but also the territories across the border?
Durrani: Here is the master of Kashmir.
Amarjit Singh Dulat, former head of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). HarperCollins
Dulat: I have no problem talking about Kashmir. It’s my favourite subject. What happened in August 2019 is sad. But this was waiting to happen. The BJP, or the NDA [National Democratic Alliance] as they call themselves, came back with a thumping majority in 2019. They felt this was the best time to do whatever they wanted to do.
Otherwise, there was nothing left in Article 370. It had been lost long ago, back in 1975 in the accord between Sheikh Abdullah and Mrs Indira Gandhi when the Sheikh recognised that accession was irrevocable. Actually, he pleaded very strongly for a revision of certain Acts passed since 1953, but nothing happened. The erosion was taking place. These guys just smacked it off.
I spoke against it. I wrote against it. Former Union minister Chidambaram spoke very passionately against it in Parliament. Ghulam Nabi Azad may have muttered something against it in the Rajya Sabha. But everybody knows that 370 is not going to come back now.
I spoke to a gentleman from RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh] at a lit fest in Chandigarh in the winter of 2020. He assured me Kashmir’s statehood would be restored soon. It was not. There is talk now — I don’t know how serious it is — that finally elections might be held in Kashmir before next winter [2023].
That is the best thing that could happen in Kashmir, provided there is a level playing field, because Kashmir needs to return to its political and democratic process. However good or bad a system is, when you have outsiders ruling your state, a part of the political process is lost. The Kashmiri has realised for the first time the importance of having one’s own government, however much one criticises it.
There has been some delimitation of constituencies. In terms of arithmetic, it is not easy to change too much in Jammu and Kashmir. Some people believe that Jammu means Hindus. No — Jammu is not all Hindus; there are a lot of areas that have a Muslim majority.
Neil K. Aggarwal, Professor of Clinical Psychiatry at Columbia University. HarperCollins
Kashmir is simply a bad mess, although infiltration has almost stopped. It’s minuscule compared to whatever there was earlier. The most positive thing to happen was the ceasefire on the Line of Control since February of last year [2021]. I hoped it would open a door for moving forward, but unfortunately that didn’t happen. It got stuck. Again, it is made conditional on waiting for possible future leaders, on the absence of leaders of the past.
There are so many imponderables, but I think Kashmir needs that healing touch again. It needs a government of its own.
Aggarwal: General Durrani, how do you assess events in Jammu and Kashmir?
Durrani: People on the Indian side of Kashmir sent messages to Mr Dulat and me that we can solve their problem — that made me feel quite happy. But they also sent messages that Pakistan made no good response to abrogation.
Paralysed or pathetic or indifferent, Pakistan did not know what to do. They redrew a map, renamed a road. This feeble reaction made me furious, which got me a few more supporters from the Indian side of Kashmir.
Even those thinking only in terms of realpolitik should worry about the humanitarian aspect. Kashmiris will suffer, but hopefully Modi’s policy will not alienate that area forever.
I mean, Modi’s abrogation was an unwise reaction, but it was going in that direction for the last many years.
Aggarwal: What advice would you give to diplomats, military personnel and intelligence officers who wish to engage in peacemaking and make the transition as you both have?
Durrani [laughing]: Dulat Saheb first. Jao Dulat Saheb [Go Dulat Saheb].
Dulat [laughing]: Jo hukam karo [Whatever you wish]. I don’t think I’m in a position to advise anyone on these matters. It should come to you naturally. That’s why I mentioned the chemistry: trust, faith, belief. I think these are truly essential. And over and above that — empathy. This whole business of we being bigger than someone else, or somebody else not being able to match up — no, that won’t help matters.
In peacemaking, like in any business, there are believers and non-believers, and it’s not confined just to spooks or the military. I felt that generals talking to each other is a great idea, because nobody understands the cost of war more than a soldier does. I don’t believe there would be any general mad enough to want war. It’s all very well and good to sit in your drawing room and simply talk about peace, but they know that war is not an option. I think that this is generally acknowledged and conceded on both sides, so what are the options left? What does common sense say then?
Covert: The Psychology of War and Peace
As General Saheb says, let’s at least have a stable stalemate. But I’m not a believer in stalemates. I believe that the status quo only helps Pakistan. I think we need to move forward.
Aggarwal: Durrani Saheb, what advice would you give?
Durrani: We continue to disagree because he still remains an incorrigible optimist.
On many points, I would agree: it’s a long haul. The peace process is not going to be clinched in one go — we need patience, perseverance; it’s a give and take — it’s not as if you can get everything and others nothing.
But there’s one point on which we will continue to disagree: I think that countries do not make peace out of the goodness of their hearts. They have to be compelled to make peace. So that compulsion is a factor to which people should give a little more thought.
What I’d advise, if you are in a position to do it, is try and raise the cost of war. Sometimes it is raised by strengthening, through the cost of resistance, as the US wants to do in the case of Ukraine by supplying more weapons. They probably assume that once the Ukrainians can defend themselves a little better, then maybe [Russian President Vladimir] Putin will back down. That is
one approach.
Another approach is to try and expand the peace lobby among people instead of giving the resistance the means to compel the enemy. The public voice in India, let’s say, has a large enough number of people supporting the peace process. Or in Pakistan, one may have to say, “We have to shed some stereotypes,” and then peace might become more likely.
Dulat: Let me say just one last thing. I agree entirely with General Saheb about peacemakers not getting carried away by this whole peace process. Yes, this India-Pakistan thing doesn’t look good these days. Nothing is going to happen in a hurry. In
fact it has not looked this bad for a long time.
Excerpted with permission from: Covert: The Psychology Of War And Peace A.S. Dulat, Assad Durrani and Neil K. Aggarwal HarperCollins Publishers India